“On the morning of May 31, 1953, plaintiff and defendants were involved in a head on collision of their automobiles on Highway 59, just immediately east of St. Louis, Oklahoma. The accident occurred on a blacktop highway 22 feet in width.”
“The fact that Wittgenstein’s attempt to get in touch with Davis failed is tragic somehow. If anyone could have helped Norbert Davis then, in my view, it was Ludwig Wittgenstein.”
Royal Rosamond was involved in a head-on collision and was crippled for the rest of his life. He sued the Reed Roller Bit company, and lost. Loyal employees of Reed are given badges to wear. You don’t mess with this outfit – or the Rosamonds – because they fought alongside Francis Marion ‘The Swamp Fox’ who is portrayed by Mel Gibson in the movie ‘The Patriot’. . Several generations of the Rosamond family took the name Francis Marion, or versions thereof. If you are named Frank, then that stems from Francis. There were two Frank Rosamonds near Saint Louis Oklahoma. Was Frank ‘Royal Rosamond’ turning into the driveway of his kin Louis Frank Rosamond when he had his collision with a car with the Reed name on the door? Did his kin encourage Royal to sue. He was severely crippled. Did he use two walking sticks to climb up the stairs to his loft after he closed his newsstand for the day? This would make a great Film Noir movie!
CROSSING THE LINE:
Ludwig Wittgenstein was shocked to hear of the death of Norbert Davis, and was determined to talk in person to someone who was close to him. A writer for the Black Mask heard Royal and Mary Rosamond were good friends of Norbert. Flying to LA, Conrad Wieneke picked him up and drove him to the Ventura home of Mary Magdalene Rosamond who was raising six children by herself. After showing Ludwig the photos Royal took of camping with Davis and other Black Mask writers, this Austrian had to get on a plane and head for Oklahoma City. Royal got Ludwig in a cheap downtown hotel, but he wanted to stay in a place like Norbert wrote about.
“My cousin Louie owns the Saint Louis Cafe and rents two rooms out. I’ll give him a call. But, let me warn you. This town is as wild as it gets. There are Wild Cat Oil Men who are right out of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves. They don’t take to outsiders. The big oil companies employ spies. There are claim jumpers ready to pounce and come in sideways like rattlesnakes to steal your oil. You don’t want to cross the line with any of these hungry wolves.”
“Sounds perfect! I am doing a study on how people do what they do, and say what they say, and, mean something different.”
The last two books I read before I became a writer, was The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann, and Under Volcano’ by Malcome Lowry. In between I read everything Kurt Vonnegut wrote. I do not call them novels. They are reports.
Francis Marion did not rape black slaves, unless they were male. He appears to have been a homosexual . His constant companion was a black man. That Royal’s granddaughter marries the cousin of the artist Thomas Hart Benton, puts the Rosamond-Benton family as the epicenter of American Culture. That Tom Snyder says in his Book of Lies Royal wrote the book Cecil B. DeMille made his first movie from, is Literary Malpractice.
(Marion Francis Marion Franklin Rosamond)
Marion Franklin /Rosamond/ , Marion Franklin /Rosamond/
The true-life pioneer behind the new Mel Gibson action film has been revealed to be not so much the stuff of legend as of law courts. The summer action flick The Patriot takes its inspiration from the exploits of a certain Francis Marion, who took on the full might of the British army during the American War of Independence. But when he wasn’t forging the land of the free, it seems that Marion was slaughtering Indians for fun and regularly raping his female slaves. Unsurprisingly, The Patriot script elected to gloss over this aspect of its protagonist’s life.
Speaking to the Daily Express, historian Christopher Hibbert claims that Marion, also known as ‘the Swamp Fox’, was “very active in the persecution of the Cherokee Indians and not at all the sort of chap who should be celebrated as a hero. The truth is that people like Marion committed atrocities as bad, if not worse, than those perpetrated by the British.”
In The Patriot (which stars Mel Gibson in the lead role), the Swamp Fox is renamed Benjamin Martin. An anonymous source from Sony Pictures admits that the film was originally conceived as a factual biography, until the makers got wind of Marion’s true history: “They couldn’t go ahead once historians had given them chapter and verse on the Swamp Fox, so they had to change his name.”
This controversy is not the first to dog the film. Two months ago it was threatened by the US censors with a prohibitive certificate for a scene which featured two children slaughtering a British soldier.
The Patriot is not the first film to airbrush the biography of its true-life subject. Heinrich Harrer, the Zen-like seeker played by Brad Pitt in Seven Years in Tibet, for instance, was subsequently revealed to have been a Nazi. Most notorious of all, perhaps, was Burt Lancaster’s soulful portrayal of the incarcerated bird-lover Robert Stroud in Birdman of Alcatraz. The film’s release provoked mass demands for Stroud to be given his freedom, but the movie neglecting to mention that Stroud had fatally stabbed a man in the prison canteen, and juggled a love of ornithology with a deep fascination with child pornography.
This letter is quoted in Norman Malcolm’s book Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Malcolm added the following footnote after Norbert Davis’s name: “As I recall, I was unable to obtain any information about this author.”
The American philosopher Norman Malcolm was a student of Wittgenstein’s at Cambridge and later became a much esteemed correspondence partner and supplier of the latest detective pulps from the United States. It would appear, however, that Malcolm did not take his friend Ludwig’s desire to read more by Davis all that seriously. In 1948 he could have got hold of some short stories and books by Norbert Davis without much difficulty. After years of writing for the pulp magazines, Davis had managed in the 1940s to have his detective stories published in book form. Between 1943 and 1947 four such books appeared: The Mouse in the Mountain (1943; the paperback issues were called Rendezvous with Fear and Dead Little Rich Girl); Sally’s in the Alley (1943); Oh Murderer Mine (1946); Murder Picks the Jury (1947).
No more books followed. In 1949, at the age of 40, Norbert Davis took his life.
The fact that Wittgenstein’s attempt to get in touch with Davis failed is tragic somehow. If anyone could have helped Norbert Davis then, in my view, it was Ludwig Wittgenstein. He was an influential philosopher who managed throughout his entire life to rope his wealthy friends and relatives into supporting hapless individuals, in particular writers and artists.
Wittgenstein’s enthusiasm for Norbert Davis’s first novel is understandable. This particular novel betrays, as do other texts by Davis, a similar mode of thinking and writing, a kind of elective affinity to Wittgenstein’s own work. What is more, in his earlier years Wittgenstein had been repeatedly haunted by thoughts of suicide. Three of his brothers had ended their lives by suicide. In fact, suicide was part and parcel of the whole milieu in which he spent his earlier life in Austria . In his biography, Ray Monk refers to that milieu as a “Laboratory for Self-destruction.”
Film noir (/nwɑːr/; French: [film nwaʁ]) is a cinematic term used primarily to describe stylish Hollywood crime dramas, particularly those that emphasize cynical attitudes and sexual motivations. The 1940s and 1950s are generally regarded as the “classic period” of American film noir. Film noir of this era is associated with a low-key, black-and-white visual style that has roots in German Expressionist cinematography. Many of the prototypical stories and much of the attitude of classic noir derive from the hardboiled school of crime fiction that emerged in the United States during the Great Depression.
The term film noir, French for ‘black film’ (literal) or ‘dark film’ (closer meaning), was first applied to Hollywood films by French critic Nino Frank in 1946, but was unrecognized by most American film industry professionals of that era. Cinema historians and critics defined the category retrospectively. Before the notion was widely adopted in the 1970s, many of the classic films noir[a] were referred to as “melodramas“. Whether film noir qualifies as a distinct genre is a matter of ongoing debate among scholars.
James Wynnegate (Dustin Farnum) and his cousin, Henry (Monroe Salisbury), are upper class Englishmen and trustees for an orphans’ fund. Henry loses money in a bet at a derby and embezzles money from “the fund” to pay off his debts. When war office officials are informed of the money missing they pursue James, but he successfully escapes to Wyoming. There, James rescues Nat-U-Ritch (Lillian St. Cyr), daughter to the chief of the Utes tribe, from local outlaw Cash Hawkins (William Elmer). Hawkins plans to exact his revenge on James, but has his plans thwarted by Nat-U-Ritch, who shoots him, dead. Later, James has an accident in the mountains and needs to be rescued. Nat-U-Ritch discovers him and carries him back to safety. As she nurses him back to health, they fall in love and later have a child.
Edwin Milton Royle (March 2, 1862 – February 16, 1942) was an American playwright. He was born in Lexington, Missouri, and died in New York City. Over 30 of his plays were performed. His best-known play is The Squaw Man (1905), which became the first Hollywood film directed by Cecil B. DeMille in 191
Supreme Court of Oklahoma
Filed: December 13th, 1955
Precedential Status: Precedential
Citations: 292 P.2d 373
Docket Number: 36746
Judges: Per Curiam
292 P.2d 373 (1955)
Frank ROSAMOND, Plaintiff in Error,
REED ROLLER BIT COMPANY, a corporation, and Robert Poole, Defendants in Error.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.December 13, 1955.Rehearing Denied January 24, 1956.
David W. Taylor and Homer Cowan, Norman, for plaintiff in error.
Embry, Crowe, Tolbert, Boxley & Johnson, V.P. Crowe and Ben L. Burdick, Oklahoma City, for defendants in error.
*374 PER CURIAM.
On the morning of May 31, 1953, plaintiff and defendants were involved in a head on collision of their automobiles on Highway 59, just immediately east of St. Louis, Oklahoma. The accident occurred on a blacktop highway 22 feet in width. At the place of collision the road was straight, though hilly, and was immediately opposite two driveways, one leading from the highway north to a church, the other, almost directly opposite leading from the highway south by a private home. Plaintiff, 63 years of age, engaged in buying and selling oil and gas leases, was driving a 1941 Chevrolet automobile in a westerly direction, and defendant, Robert Poole, 28 or 29 years of age, an employee of defendant, Reed Roller Bit Company, was driving a 1952 Chevrolet automobile, owned by said defendant company, in an easterly direction. The collision occurred just north of the center line of the paved road. The plaintiff sustained severe injuries as a result of the accident.
In his petition plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent in that the defendant driver failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles upon the highway; failed to keep his vehicle under proper control; was driving at an excessive and dangerous speed; was driving at a rate of speed greater than would permit him to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead; and that he failed to keep to the right of the center of said paved road, operating his vehicle on the north or wrong side of the road.
He testified that he was driving west at not to exceed 30 miles per hour; that he first saw defendants’ automobile as it was coming down the long hill coming out of St. Louis; that it went out of his vision by reason of a small intervening hill; that he next saw said vehicle as it came over the small intervening hill; that its left wheels were then on the north or wrong side of the center line of the highway; that he was on his side of the center line of said highway and pulled his vehicle further to the north side of the road; that he did not apply his brakes; that he remembered nothing more until about 10 days later in the hospital at Shawnee.
Defendant driver denied that he had been driving on the north or wrong side of the road prior to the immediate time of the collision; that when he came over the small hill he was driving his vehicle at approximately 50 miles per hour; that he observed plaintiff’s vehicle when it was approximately 400 feet away; that plaintiff was driving his vehicle to the south of the center line of the highway and was looking to the south; that he thought plaintiff was intending to make a left turn; that he tapped his brakes to break the speed of his car in order to permit plaintiff to get across in front of him; that plaintiff’s car continued on toward his car instead of making a left turn and he braked his car hard and attempted to pull across the highway to the north in order to go to the left of plaintiff; that when he applied the brakes hard, plaintiff looked up and pulled his car sharply to the left and the cars collided; that when he began applying his brakes all wheels of the vehicle he was driving were to the south and right side of the center line; that, in attempting to avoid the collision, he pulled to the north and wrong side of the road.
The cause was submitted to a jury which returned a verdict for defendant.
In his appeal plaintiff has presented several alleged errors. However, in his brief he argues, in effect, only two propositions; the contention under both propositions being that the trial court committed error in *375 giving Instruction No. 10, concerning the duty of a driver when confronted with a sudden emergency.
The rule that, “though a question be raised in the motion for new trial and also by assignment of error on appeal, yet, if it is not presented in the brief, argument made thereon, and authorities cited, this court will hold the question as waived;” is so well settled in this Court as to need no citation of authority. We therefore deal with only the proposition hereinbefore set forth.
Plaintiff contends that in giving Instruction No. 10, the trial court did not give sufficient consideration to his theory of the case. Such contention cannot be sustained. The allegations of his petition, upon which the theory of defendant’s negligence was based, were that, defendant failed to maintain a proper lookout; failed to keep his vehicle under proper control; was driving at an excessive and dangerous rate of speed; was driving at a rate of speed greater than would permit him to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead; and, that he failed to keep to the right of the center of the road. All such separate theories of negligence were covered by the instructions of the court in Instructions 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. Instruction 5 given by the court recited the statute requiring that a person drive an automobile at a careful and prudent speed, not greater or less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway, and requiring that a person not drive an automobile at a speed greater than would permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Instruction No. 6, recited the statute requiring that vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall pass each other to the right, and further recited the statute prohibiting a driver when approaching the crest of a grade, from driving to the left of the center of the road. Instruction No. 7, stated that it was the duty of persons operating vehicles on the highways of this State to observe the state laws, as defined in the instructions, and a violation of same was negligence per se, with the requirement that such negligence be the proximate cause of the injuries and damage sustained. Instruction No. 8, set forth the common law requirement that all drivers must exercise ordinary care under the facts and circumstances existing. Instruction No. 9, instructed the jury that the rights, duties and obligations of the drivers of the automobiles involved were mutual and reciprocal, and that it was the duty of both drivers, as they approached the point where the collision occurred, to exercise ordinary care in the management of their vehicles to prevent injury to other persons upon the highway at said point; and that it was the duty of the drivers to drive their vehicles at a reasonable rate of speed under the existing circumstances and to keep their vehicles under reasonable and proper control. It further instructed the jury that it was the duty of the drivers to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in keeping a lookout ahead, consistent with the safety of other vehicles and persons that might be using and traveling upon the highway.
We are of the opinion that the instructions thus given plainly and succinctly informed the jury of the law covering the theories of the plaintiff. In cases too numerous to mention or require citation we have held, that no particular paragraph of the instructions need contain all the law of the case and that if the instructions as a whole properly state the law applicable to plaintiff’s cause and defendants’ theory of defense, the instructions are proper. Hartman v. Dunn, 186 Okl. 9, 95 P.2d 897.
In his contention that the court erred in giving Instruction No. 10, plaintiff cites and relies upon Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., v. Kirby, 208 Okl. 68, 253 P.2d 139 and Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okl. 112, 247 P.2d 964 as being authority for the proposition that where a driver of a vehicle drives to the left of the center of the road and has a collision with another vehicle which he is meeting, the driver on the wrong side of the road is at fault. Neither of the cases cited is in point with the factual situation herein involved. The Gillette case, supra, developed upon the insufficiency *376 of the evidence to establish negligence upon behalf of the defendant driver; while in the case of Ruther v. Tyra, supra, the jury chose to believe defendant’s evidence rather than that of plaintiff. Whether or not the driver who is on the wrong side of the road is always at fault depends upon the situation, and the peculiar circumstances of each case, and the question of who is at fault under such circumstances is a jury question. To say otherwise would require this Court to assume the defendant was negligent as a matter of law.
In the case at bar defendant has invoked the so-called emergency doctrine. He plead it in his answer and his testimony was to that effect. According to the latter he was at all times to the south of the center line of the pavement until such times as he applied his brakes and the emergency presented itself. His testimony is corroborated by the highway patrolman who worked the accident as well as at least one of plaintiff’s witnesses. Plaintiff and other of his witnesses testified to the contrary. Such testimony was in direct conflict as to which of the drivers was driving to the left or wrong side of the center line of the highway, thereby causing such emergency, and being in conflict, presented a question for the jury under proper instruction of the court.
In order to apply the emergency rule, it must be made to appear that the party seeking to invoke it is free from negligence in connection with the emergency. Feuquay v. Ecker, 195 Okl. 285, 157 P.2d 745, and cases therein cited.
We have carefully examined the instruction complained of and we think it correctly states the law and is not prejudicial to plaintiff. Under the evidence, the matter was properly submitted to the jury, and we find no error in the instructions given.
The judgment is affirmed.
The Court acknowledges the aid of the Supreme Court Commissioners in the preparation of this opinion. After a tentative opinion was written by Commissioner REED, and approved by Commissioners CRAWFORD and NEASE, the cause was assigned to a Justice of this Court for examination and report to the Court. Thereafter, upon report and consideration in conference, the foregoing opinion was adopted by the Court.